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PREVIEW; Bullock v. Fox: The Meaning of the Term “Land
Acquisition” in Montana Code Annotated § 87–1–209(1)
Jacob Rebo
Oral Argument is set for Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:30 a.m.
in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court in Helena, MT.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the Court with two issues. The first is
whether Petitioners (collectively “Gov. Bullock”), Governor
Bullock, in his official capacity, and Martha Williams, in her official
capacity as Director of the Fish, Wildlife, and Parks Department
(“FWP”), have standing to bring suit against Respondent (“Att’y
Gen. Fox”), Attorney General Fox, in his official capacity. 1 The
second issue before the Court is whether the term “land acquisition”
in Mont. Code Ann. § 87–1–209(1) applies to non-possessory
property interests.2
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Montana Legislature enacted § 87–1–209(1) in 1981.3
The relevant portion of the statute reads:
. . . the department [FWP], with the consent of the
commission or the board and, in the case of land
acquisition involving more than 100 acres or
$100,000 in value, the approval of the board of land
commissioners, may acquire by purchase, lease,
agreement, gift, or devise and may acquire easements
upon lands or waters for the purposes listed in this
subsection.4
Since 1982, FWP has brought sixty–nine conservation easement
proposals before the Land Board (“Board”). 5 Prior to September,
2017, the Board had unanimously voted on every conservation
easement proposal, approving 66 and unanimously rejecting only

1

Brief of Respondent at 3, Bullock v. Fox, https://perma.cc/F72X–NHZC
(Mont. Nov. 13, 2018) (No. OP 18-0599).
2
Petitioner’s Principal Brief at 9, Bullock v. Fox, https://perma.cc/U7SW–
5KHA (Mont. Oct. 22, 2018) (No. OP 18-0599).
3
Id. at 13.
4
57 Op. Att’y Gen. 4 at [P3], https://perma.cc/F2T2–V7G9 (Mont. Oct. 15,
2018).
5
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, Exhibit A, Attachment 1.
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one. 6 Since October, 2017, the Board has approved only one
conservation easement proposal and rejected three others with
fractured votes.7 The FWP Commission has approved each of the
three rejected proposals. 8 Gov. Bullock ordered FWP to proceed
with the easement purchases at issue here pursuant to an
interpretation of § 87–1–209(1) that does not require Board approval
for conservation easement purchases.9
Pursuant to this interpretation, Att’y Gen. Fox, at the request
of Senate President Scott Sales, issued an opinion rejecting Gov.
Bullock’s interpretation of § 87–1–209(1). 10 Gov. Bullock
petitioned the Supreme Court for declaratory relief, arguing that the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to hear this case. 11 Att’y
Gen. Fox responded, challenging Gov. Bullock’s standing and
arguing that “land acquisitions” in § 87–1–209(1) includes nonpossessory land interests such as conservation easements,
necessitating Board approval.12
III. THE STANDING ISSUE
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Gov. Bullock requests relief based on the requirements for
original jurisdiction in Rule 14(4) of the Montana Rules of Appellate
Procedure. 13 They argue that (1) the case involves a purely legal
question of statutory construction; (2) the case has major statewide
importance, and (3) the situation is urgent and therefore the normal
appeal process is inadequate.14 Gov. Bullock maintains that review
is appropriate without specifically addressing standing.15
On the other side, Att’y Gen. Fox does not challenge that the
matter in dispute meets the criteria for original jurisdiction. Att’y
Gen. Fox does argue that Gov. Bullock has no standing to bring this
action.16 Att’y Gen. Fox argues that Gov. Bullock: (1) cannot show
an actual or imminent injury that would affect them in a “personal
and individual way”; (2) that Gov. Bullock cannot bring the action
6

Id.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, Wolf Affidavit, Attachment 1.
8
Id. at 2.
9
Id.
10
57 Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra note 4, at [P1].
11
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 18.
12
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 21.
13
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 7–8.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 3–10.
7
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solely in their official capacities; and (3) because the injury is to the
State, any action to be brought would be under the sole discretion of
the Attorney General.17
The first issue Att’y Gen. Fox raises is that Gov. Bullock
cannot show sufficient injury to satisfy standing.18 Att’y Gen. Fox
argues that the Court cannot hear this case unless Gov. Bullock can
show a personal past, present, or threatened injury to a property or a
civil right that would be alleviated by the Court’s action.19 Att’y Gen.
Fox argues that the alleged injury is to the State, or at most to the
offices of Gov. Bullock, which would arguably be irrelevant here
because they are bringing suit in their official capacities.20
The second issue Att’y Gen. Fox raises is that Gov. Bullock
may not bring suit in their official capacities. 21 To support this
argument, Att’y Gen. Fox cites Raines v. Byrd, 22 a United States
Supreme Court case that held individual members of Congress did
not have sufficient “personal stake” to satisfy standing
requirements.23
Att’y Gen. Fox’s final argument concerning standing is that
Gov. Bullock cannot bring this issue to the Court because the
Attorney General has the sole prerogative to bring cases on behalf
of the State, and he has not approved this matter.24 Att’y Gen. Fox
cites Olsen v. PSC, a case where the Court held that the Attorney
General could not be precluded from arguing a case on the State’s
behalf.25 Att’y Gen. Fox argues that this gives the office of Attorney
General exclusive discretion as to the state matters the Court is
constitutionally allowed to hear. 26 The Montana Constitution
provides that the AG is the “legal officer of the State.”27 The duties
of the Attorney General according to Montana Code Annotated § 2–
15–501(1) include the responsibility “to prosecute or defend all
causes in the supreme court in which the state or any officer of the
state in the officer’s official capacity is a party or in which the state
has an interest.”

17

Id.
Id. at 3.
19
Mitchell v. Glacier Cty., 406 P.3d 427, 431 (Mont. 2017).
20
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 4–9.
21
Id. at 5–6.
22
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
23
Id. at 818–19.
24
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 8–9.
25
State ex. Rel. Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 283 P.2d 594, 597 (Mont. 1955).
26
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 8.
27
MONT. CONST. art VI, § 4, cl 4.
18
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B. Analysis: The Court Will Likely Find Gov. Bullock Has
Standing
Gov. Bullock may not be able to show a sufficient personal
injury for standing. However, the Court has previously recognized
standing for petitioners who meet the requirements for original
jurisdiction but cannot show an injury with a direct adverse effect.28
In Grossman, the Court held, “Where urgent and emergency
factors . . . excite [the Court’s] acceptance of original jurisdiction,”
the Court may “drape” the petitioner in standing despite showing no
particular injury.29 The case at hand appears to have similar “urgent
and emergency” factors to Grossman. The Court noted in Grossman
that the State was hamstrung in its ability to carry out the legislation,
and that the “health and welfare of a large segment of the State’s
population” would be affected, if the issue was not resolved. 30
Similarly, Gov. Bullock argues that the conservation easements in
question will expire by the end of November. 31 Thousands of
Montanans make use of the State’s conservation easements. The
Court could find that the issue is not only ripe but has “urgent and
emergency factors” sufficient to grant Gov. Bullock standing.
Att’y Gen. Fox argues that Raines holds that public officials
may not bring suit solely in their official capacity. 32 This is an
incorrect reading of Raines. The Raines Court upheld Coleman v.
Miller,33 a previous ruling that allowed State legislators to bring suit
in their official capacity.34 The dispositive issue was that the State
legislators constituted a large enough group that their votes would
have been sufficient to defeat or enact the specific legislation in
question before the Court.35 In short, public officials may bring suit
in their official capacity if the issue “completely nullifies” their
ability to carry out their official duties. 36 The governor is
constitutionally charged with faithfully executing the laws of the
State. 37 His powers to do so in this instance have arguably been
“completely nullified” by the disagreement over the meaning of a
statute he is trying to enforce. Additionally, the Court has previously
28

Grossman v. State, Dept. of Natural Res., 682 P.2d 1319, 1325 (Mont. 1984)
(holding that a taxpayer has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a tax
when the requirements of original jurisdiction are met).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 2.
32
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 7.
33
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
34
Raines, 521 U.S. at 826 (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)).
35
Id. at 823.
36
Id. at 826.
37
MONT. CONST. art VI, § 4.
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heard cases brought by the Governor in his official capacity when
urgent and important matters of statutory construction are at issue.38
The Court will likely find that Gov. Bullock meets Coleman and can
therefore bring suit in their official capacity.
Att’y Gen. Fox’s argument that the Attorney General has
plenary and exclusive discretion as to which State related cases may
go before the Court is overbroad and would have significant
deleterious effects. Court precedent and § 2–15–501(1) clearly point
to an interpretation that the AG may not be precluded from
prosecuting or defending a state matter. Att’y Gen. Fox is not being
precluded from arguing this case before the Court. Furthermore, the
Attorney General is part of the Executive branch, but he is an elected
official and does not serve at the appointment and pleasure of the
Governor. 39 For the Court to find that his office is the only
Executive branch agent that can petition the Court would drastically
undermine the ability of other Executive branch agents to fulfill their
Constitutionally mandated duties. The Court will likely not be
persuaded by this argument from Att’y Gen. Fox.
Thus, the Court will likely ultimately find that Gov. Bullock
has standing to bring suit in their official capacities against Att’y
Gen. Fox.
IV. THE ISSUE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When the Court undertakes an analysis of the meaning of a
term, it first looks to see if it is defined in the statute.40 The Court
then looks to the “ordinary meaning” of the term.41 If the ordinary
meaning does not readily resolve the issue, the Court looks to
statutory use of the term.42 When the Court looks to a statute for
clarification of meaning, it reads the whole statue.43 If meaning is
still ambiguous after an intra–statute analysis, the Court may look to
other relevant statutes. 44 If the Court has not found sufficient
clarification within the statute, they will next turn to an analysis of

38

State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm., 543 P. 2d 1317 (Mont. 1975);
Schwinden v. Burlington N., 691 P.2d 1351 (Mont. 1984).
39
MONT. CONST. art VI, § 1.
40
Basset v. Lamantia, 417 P.3d 299, 321 (Mont. 2018).
41
State v. Alpine Aviation, Inc. 384 P.3d 1035, 1037 (Mont. 2016).
42
Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t. of Labor and Indus., 291 P.3d 1231,
1245 (Mont. 2012).
43
Id.
44
Id.

65

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 79

legislative history. 45 Finally, if the Court still cannot ascertain
meaning, they may look to outside sources, such as public policy.46
A. The Parties’ Arguments
The term “land acquisition” is not defined in the statute, so
the Court will look first for the “ordinary meaning” of the term.47
Gov. Bullock and Att’y Gen. Fox argue for two different meanings
of “land acquisition,” citing the same dictionary definitions for “land”
and “acquisition.” Gov. Bullock argues that a combination of
dictionary definitions of the two separate terms clearly means
“gaining possession of a portion of the earth’s solid surface.” 48
Att’y Gen. Fox notes that Gov. Bullock‘s combination of the
definitions of “land” and “acquisition” could also be formulated as
“gaining possession or control over a portion of the earth’s solid
surface.”49 Att’y Gen. Fox argues that “land acquisition” is a nonspecific term that refers to any “legally cognizable interest in
land.”50
Gov. Bullock argues that the statute clearly espouses a
definition of “land acquisition” that excludes non-possessory
interests in land. Section 87 of the Montana Code Annotated
contains three references to “land acquisition.” 51 The first is the
provision in question, § 87–1–209(1). The second is in § 87–1–
301(1), which states that the FWP Commission must approve “all
acquisitions . . . of interests in land.”52 Gov. Bullock argues that this
distinction is dispositive, relying on the canon of meaningful
variation, which holds that where legislators use different terms
within the same statute, the Court may infer different meanings.53
The third use of “land acquisition” in § 87–1–218 requires notice for
all “land acquisitions,” which does not offer any clarity to the
meaning in § 87–1–209(1).54
Att’y Gen. Fox argues that the different terms in Section 87
do not refer to type, but rather to scope, stating that the use of
“acquisitions of interests in land” in § 87–1–301(1) refers to all land
45

Gannet Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t. of Revenue 201 P.3d
132, 136 (Mont. 2009).
46
See Theil v. Taurus Drilling, Ltd., 710 P.2d 33 (Mont. 1985).
47
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 9.
48
Id. at 10.
49
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis in original).
50
Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra note 4, at [P17].
51
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 10–12.
52
Id. at 10–11.
53
Id. at 11.
54
Id. at 12.
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interest acquisitions, and that the “land acquisition” use in § 87–1–
209(1) refer to all land interest acquisitions in excess of 100 acres or
$100,000.55 Att’y Gen. Fox and Gov. Bullock both agree with the
Court that an easement is not a possessory interest in land.56
Gov. Bullock supports his interpretation of “land acquisition”
by appealing across the Code, citing 11 statutory uses of the term
“land acquisition.”57 Gov. Bullock argues that every use of “land
acquisition” in the Code outside of Section 87 appears in
conjunction with possessory interests in land, and never with nonpossessory interests, supporting a definition of “land acquisition”
that does not include nonpossessory interests such as conservation
easements.58
Att’y Gen. Fox argues that any ambiguity in § 87–1–209(1)
is clarified by § 23–1–102(3):
A contract, for any of the purposes of this part, many
not be entered into or another obligation incurred
until money has been appropriated by the legislature
or is otherwise available. If the contract or obligation
pertains to acquisition of areas or sites in excess of
either 100 acres or $100,000 in value, the board of
land commissioners shall specifically approve the
acquisition.”59
Att’y Gen. Fox argues that this language is clear and unambiguous,
and that Gov. Bullock’s reading of “land acquisition” would allow
the State Parks and Recreation Board to acquire conservation
easements without the approval of the Board, which Respondent
argues would “defy logic.”60
The “ordinary meaning” arguments do not provide the
necessary clarity to determine that “land acquisition” contains or
excludes non-possessory interests in its plain meaning. The same
dictionary meanings are combined to provide two different
definitions of “land acquisition.” The Court will need to look to the
statute for clarification.

55

Id.
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 10; 57 Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra
note 4, at [P4].
57
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 12.
58
Id.
59
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, at 13.
60
Id. at 13–14.
56
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B. Analysis of “ordinary meaning” and Statutory
Interpretation.
The arguments supporting either interpretation using the
language of Section 87 both have merit, and it is difficult to predict
if the Court will be swayed by either of them. The Court has adhered
to the canon of meaningful variation in the past, but both Gov.
Bullock and Att’y Gen. Fox agree that the meanings of §§ 87–1–
209(1) and 301 have different meanings.61 The Court will likely turn
to other relevant statutes for clarification.
Gov. Bullock’s analysis cites every other instance of the
term “land acquisition” found within the code. 62 Each instance
implies only possessory interests. No instant use explicitly excludes
non-possessory interests in land, but the term is never used in
connection with regulating easements or other non-possessory
interests in land.
On Att’y Gen. Fox’s argument that Gov. Bullock’s reading
would “defy logic,” it is noteworthy that Section 23 of the Code
makes no reference to conservation easements whatsoever. It is
unclear if the Parks and Recreation board oversees the acquisition
of any non-possessory interests in land. Furthermore, if an adoption
of Gov. Bullock’s narrow definition of “land acquisition” would
allow the Parks and Recreation board to approve non-possessory
land interest purchases, Att’y Gen. Fox fails to clarify why this
would “defy logic” without begging the question of what “land
acquisition” means.
This level of argument favors Gov. Bullock’s reading of
“land acquisition” in § 87–1–209(1). The Court may conclude at this
stage that the statutory analysis is sufficient to determine that the
legislature intended “land acquisition” in § 87–1–209(1) to exclude
non-possessory interests such as conservation easements. If the
Court has not found sufficient meaning, they will next turn to a
legislative history analysis.
V. The Issue of Legislative History

61

Zinvest, LLC v. Gunnersfield Enters, Inc., 405 P.3d 1270, 1276 (Mont. 2017)
(“Because the enacting Legislature did not use identical language in the two
provisions, it is proper . . . to assume that a different statutory meaning was
intended.”).
62
I conducted separate searches of “land acquisition,” “land,” and “acquisition”
within the Montana Code Annotated. The 11 statutes cited in the Petitioner’s
Brief are the only instances outside of Section 87 at issue in this case.
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If the Court cannot ascertain meaning through statutory
construction, it will next turn to an analysis of legislative history.63
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Gov. Bullock looks to the legislative history of § 87–1–
209(1) to argue that the legislature’s purpose for passing the
proposed statute was to respond to citizens’ concerns that the State
government’s purchase of conservation lands would erode their tax
base.64 The statute provides that FWP will pay a sum equal to the
taxes payable to the county if it was taxable to a private citizen.65
Att’y Gen. Fox agrees that this was a large focus of the
legislation but argues that it was not the only intent for the statute.66
Att’y Gen. Fox argues that other concerns, such as concerns about
Government spending, support a broad interpretation of “land
acquisition.”67 Att’y Gen. Fox also cites to comments made during
debate of the statute, where then–FWP Commissioner Jim Flynn
argued against the bill because FWP’s “acceptance of conservation
easements would be curtailed.” 68 This statement, Att’y Gen. Fox
maintains, is dispositive in determining that the legislature intended
to include non-possessory interests in the definition of “land
acquisition.”69
In response, Gov. Bullock argues that Commissioner Flynn
made this statement opposing an earlier version of the bill that never
made it out of committee, and that he made this statement in broad
opposition to the provisions of the bill that he felt would inhibit
FWP’s ability to acquire conservation easements and not to the
specific provisions concerning Board approval. 70 Gov. Bullock
further supports this reading of Flynn’s comments by noting that
Flynn, directly after the statute was enacted, maintained that
conservation easements did not require approval of the Board.71
B. Analysis of Legislative History

63

Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t. of Revenue 201 P.3d
132, 136 (Mont. 2009).
64
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 13–14.
65
MONT. CODE ANN. § 87–1–218(3)(c) (2017).
66
Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra note 4, at [P37].
67
Id.
68
Id. at [P38–39].
69
Id.
70
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 14.
71
Id. at 13, 17–18.
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The legislative history for § 87–1–209(1) is unclear as to the
intent of the legislature to include non-possessory interests in the
definition of “land acquisitions.” Both Gov. Bullock and Att’y Gen.
Fox appear to agree that the main drive behind the legislation was
to protect the tax base.72 Att’y Gen. Fox presented one comment
from a legislator that raises the issue of Government spending and
accountability.73 This one comment is insufficient to conclude that
the legislature clearly intended “land acquisitions” to include nonpossessory interests in the statute.
Additionally, Commissioner Flynn’s comments during the
legislative debate taken without context would support Att’y Gen.
Fox’s argument that Flynn believed “land acquisition” in § 87–1–
209 to refer to non-possessory interests. However, an examination
of the full record, including his subsequent comments and behavior,
support that Flynn was opposed to the bill in general and was not
conceding that Board approval would apply to the acquisition of
non-possessory property interests.
If the Court finds itself looking to the legislative history in
this case to determine the meaning of “land acquisition,” neither
argument tips the scale. Att’y Gen. Fox’s arguments establish that
the legislature did not explicitly intend to exclude non-possessory
interests from the meaning, but both sides concede that the main
purpose of the bill was to protect the tax base.74 Att’y Gen. Fox’s
arguments that the legislature explicitly intended to include nonpossessory interests is a misuse of Commissioner Flynn’s comments.
Therefore, this mode of statutory construction does not conclusively
favor either interpretation.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS
Finally, if the Court still cannot ascertain meaning, it may
look to outside sources, such as public policy.75
A. The Parties’ Arguments

Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 13–14; Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra
note 4, at [P37].
73
Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra note 4, at [37], citing Minutes of the Meeting of the
Fish and Game Committee, at 3 (Jan 24, 1981) (“Representative Curtiss, the
primary sponsor of HB 251, testified she was concerned with the amount of
money the F.W. & P. can spend on land acquisition.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
74
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 13–14; Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra
note 4, at [P37].
75
See Theil v. Taurus Drilling, Ltd., 710 P.2d 33 (Mont. 1985).
72
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In his final argument, Att’y Gen. Fox refers to FWP’s long
history of bringing conservation easement proposals to the land
board for approval. 76 This argument also refers to the FWP
administrative guidance on conservation easements, which states
that conservation easements over the size and price amount in § 87–
1–209 will be brought before the Board for approval.77 The FWP
began bringing conservation easement proposals before the land
board in 1992.78 It adopted the practice as agency policy. 79 Att’y
Gen. Fox argues that these facts show FWP’s “repeated assurances
to the public that FWP’s expenditures of funds for the easement
acquisitions would be subject to (approval by the Land Board).”80
Finally, Att’y Gen. Fox presents a letter, written by Don Childress,
an FWP administrator, in 1992, which states that “Statute 87–1–209
requires approval of this easement by the Land Board.”81
Gov. Bullock argues against this reasoning, instead relying
on the public policy of adhering to the meaning of the statute. Gov.
Bullock states, “Here, the notion that an agency is bound by a prior,
incorrect interpretation of a statute is both wrong as a matter of law
and troubling as a matter of policy. Past practice cannot transfigure
the meaning of a statute.”82 This argument is not supported by any
cited case law, but Gov. Bullock cites § 1–2–102, which states that
“[i]n the construction of a statute, the intention of the legislature is
to be pursued if possible.”83
B. Analysis of the Public Policy Arguments
Att’y Gen. Fox’s argument here seems to rest on the notion
of acquiescence. Notably, the Court has applied the notion of
legislative acquiescence in the past.84 Additionally, the Court has
supported Gov. Bullock’s public policy argument as it has held
previously that the State “cannot be estopped by the unauthorized
acts of its officers or agents.” 85 This holding supports the policy
Op. Att’y Gen. 4, supra note 4, at [41].
Id. at [42].
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at [49].
81
Brief of Respondent, supra note 1, Exhibit B, Attachment 1.
82
Petitioner’s Principal Brief, supra note 2, at 17.
83
Id.
84
Darby Spar, LTD. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 705 P.2d 111, 113 (Mont. 1985). The
Court upheld a 40-year-old tax statute’s present application because the
legislature had “acquiesced” to it, saying: “Forty years is adequate time for the
legislature to become aware of how the legislation it drafted is being interpreted
and enforced.”
85
Norman v. Montana, 597 P.2d 715, 718 (Mont. 1979) (internal citations
omitted).
76
77

71
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argument that the correct interpretation of a statute is the benchmark
for the Judiciary. Similarly, In O’Shaughnessy, the Court held that
the acts of administrators or executive officials interpreting statutes
cannot change the clear meaning of the legislation. 86 The
O’Shaughnesy Court held that to accept legislative acquiescence
would “undermine the enactments by official action and nullify
otherwise validly adopted laws.”87 Although this case is factually
different from O’Shaughnesy, the Court clearly articulated Gov.
Bullock’s sentiment in its ruling.
Should the Court weigh these two arguments, it will not only
be faced with evaluating the facts of each precedent with the case at
hand. It will also be faced with weighing the validity of the dueling
underlying policy arguments. Is acquiescence, the notion that a
legislature’s inaction can provide dispositive information about the
intent of the statute, more relevant or important here? Or, is it more
applicable and imperative that statutes mean what they mean, and
incorrect administrative or executive interpretation, even when it
spans several years, cannot change that meaning?
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Court will likely find the necessary
requirements for standing and original jurisdiction are met. On the
question of statutory interpretation, the totality of the legislative
record suggests that it is likely the Court will find “land acquisition”
to refer only to possessory interests in land as pertaining to § 87–1–
209(1).

86
87

O’Shaughnessy v. Wolfe, 685 P.2d 361, 368 (Mont. 1984).
Id. at 364.

